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This thesis aims to illuminate the factors that have contributed to Chinese policy 
changes regarding UN peacekeeping operations. Using Yongjin Zhang’s framework, it 
identifies four phases of evolution in China’s UN peacekeeping participation: opposition, 
non-interference, cooperation, and participation. The reasons for a state’s participation in 
peacekeeping operations are diverse, ranging from self-interest to altruism. The evolution 
of Chinese support for UN peacekeeping is derived from its self-interested security 
concerns and its self-identity in relation to other states. When China believed its security 
was threatened, it sought opportunities to balance the threat by developing ties with 
international organizations and powers. Subsequently, as it has grown into those 
organizations, China has identified itself as a leader within them. China’s defense of 
Westphalian principles of sovereignty creates the impression that China is in opposition 
to Western powers in their efforts to propose, pass, and execute UN peacekeeping 
operations. This has led scholars and politicians to question the degree of commitment 
China has to UN peacekeeping principles and institutions. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gradually evolved from opposing most 
international organizations to supporting and joining many of them. China’s involvement 
in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has followed a similar evolution, and it 
is currently an active supporter and participant in UN peacekeeping operations. Just like 
in other international organizations and activities, China has gradually become more 
involved, taking pragmatic and disciplined steps in selecting and participating in UN 
peacekeeping operations. China is currently participating in 11 United Nations 
peacekeeping operations with 3,042 personnel, contributing by far the most personnel of 
all of the UN permanent Security Council members. Despite its apparently large 
contribution, China provides guarded support to UN peacekeeping operations as it does 
not support every mission and still provides vigorous debate when issues of sovereignty 
come up. Which factors explain China’s evolution from its early opposition to all UN 
peacekeeping operations to its current rate of participation? This thesis will examine the 
motivating factors of self-interest and altruism using existing literature to determine the 
dominant factor. 
This thesis aims to understand the factors that have contributed to Chinese policy 
changes in regards to UN peacekeeping operations. Using Yongjin Zhang’s framework it 
identifies four phases of evolution in China’s UN peacekeeping participation: opposition, 
non-interference, cooperation, and participation. The reason for a state’s participation in 
peacekeeping operations are diverse, ranging from self-interest to altruistic. The Chinese 
evolution in its support of UN peacekeeping is derived from its self-interested security 
concerns and its self-identity in relation to other states. When China believed its security 
was threatened it sought opportunities to balance the threat by developing ties with 
international organizations and powers. Subsequently, as it has grown into those 
organizations China has developed an identity that it should be a leader within them. 
China’s defense of Westphalian principles of sovereignty creates the impression that 
China is in opposition to Western powers in their efforts to propose, pass, and execute 
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UN peacekeeping operations. This has led scholars and politicians to question the degree 
of commitment China has to UN peacekeeping principles and institutions. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis will increase awareness of the factors that influence China’s policy 
choices in regards to the UN. This will create a better understanding of how committed 
China is to UN peacekeeping within the current set of global norms and will shed some 
light on whether China will attempt to use its influence to reshape the UN global 
peacekeeping missions in manners more in keeping with China’s own interests. In 
addition, this thesis will create a greater appreciation of what influence China’s policy 
decisions will enable more effective communications and negotiations with China as well 
as insights on how to persuade the China to greater contributions to UN peacekeeping 
operations  
Understanding the factors that have led to China’s changes in foreign policy in 
regards to UN PKO’s will create better a understanding of what has influenced China to 
become more involved in international institutions, and how the leadership in China has 
developed strategies to work in those institutions despite difference in values. Knowledge 
of which factors have the most significance will enable policy makers to better leverage 
negotiations with China.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is organized into two main sections. The first explores the 
general evolution of norms and how they are applied to United Nations peacekeeping 
operation. This section examines how and why countries become involved in 
peacekeeping operations and how the UN has modified its peacekeeping operations 
overtime to mirror changes in global norms. 
The second section will examine with the evolution of China’s foreign policy into 
support of peacekeeping operations after years of opposition and then abstaining. This 
section will then review some of the factors that may have influenced China to become 
involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
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1. Peacekeeping Justifications, and Norms and Applications 
Self-interest has been postulated by many as a key factor in states becoming 
involved in peacekeeping. Jacob Kathman and Molly Melin explore the security benefits 
derived from states that provide peacekeepers.1 They explore the trend of developing 
states providing a significant number of troops to peacekeeping operations. Vincenzo 
Bove and Leandro Elia discuss proximity of threat from the unrest a causal factor for 
states to engage in peacekeeping operations. Andrea Carati and Andrea Locatelli use Italy 
as a case study to determine whether self-interest, or identity issues prevail in influencing 
peacekeeping operations. John Karlsrud and Kari Osland use Norway as a case study to 
examine how security issues from the perspective of a small power have influenced its 
decisions to participate in international organizations with the goal of global security. 
Humanitarian intervention has a long history even prior to the United Nations; 
states would have often intervened in the borders of others states to aid people.2 William 
Durch studies the modern role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and how it has 
evolved.3 In Durch’s introduction, he demonstrates that the fall of the colonial empires 
brought about humanitarian crises that were greater than the host states could handle.4 
The UN was often ineffective as it could not compete with the bipolar activities of the 
Soviet Union and the United States.5 The two superpowers would often balance each 
other by vetoing a proposal in UN which limited the number of peacekeeping missions, 
or changed or restricted the mandate to unarmed observers. Several of the case studies 
demonstrate how the UN has created and modified its policies in creating mandates and 
manning and equipping them. The collapse of the Soviet Union led, in part, to a four-fold 
                                                 
1 Jacob M. Kathman and Molly D. Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State 
Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” International Studies Quarterly (2016): 1. 
2 Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2008), 4. 
3 William J. Durch, “Introduction,” in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin’s Press 1993), 1. 
4 Ibid., 1. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
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increase in UN PKOs by 1992.6 Of the 16 ongoing missions 38% were started before 
1991 indicating a refining of procedures to better determine success or failure.7 Trevor 
Findlay echoes that argument by breaking up peacekeeping into the cold war and post-
cold war eras.8 This theory explains that the destabilization after the collapse in the 
balance of power in great power politics left some states in disarray. The power battle for 
resources and international prestige was over causing the great powers to retrench. The 
U.S. and Russia re-evaluated their vital interests and determined that some of the fragile 
states no longer were crucial to their security. These fragile states that were no longer 
received the support they so badly needed to maintain control of their populations.  
The motivations for states to become involved in UN peacekeeping operations has 
also changed. Gary Bass’s work discusses identity as a key factor. He demonstrates that a 
nation that has a similar identity with the victims is more likely to intercede in another 
state with a humanitarian mission.9 Support to other peoples in other states grew from 
ethnic and national identities to include a connection based on shared humanity.10 Bass 
shows how the writing of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke transformed the way some 
elites viewed the status identity, changing their allegiance from ethnic or civic to that of a 
large human connection.11 Martha Finnemore echoes this theory in her work by stating, 
“Who is human has changed, that is, who can successfully claim humanitarian protection 
from strong states has changed.”12 One of the key roles in developing the ties between 
the victims and the group seeking intervention is the media.13 The media develops the 
                                                 
6 William J. Durch, “Introduction,” in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and 
Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin’s Press 1993), 463. 
7 United Nations, Peace Keeping Operations, List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2013, 
accessed 21 September 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf. 
8 Trevor Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” in Challenges for the New 
Peacekeepers, SIPRI Research Report 12, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
1. 
9 Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2008), 19. 
10 Ibid., 20. 
11 Ibid., 22. 
12 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force 
(Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2003), 53. 
13 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force 25. 
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linkages between peoples on a human level creating the impetus for action to help the 
people in need. China’s self-identity as a developing state may impel it to support its 
fellow down trodden or will the great power identity force a more pragmatic response.  
Findlay states that peacekeeping motivations have changed since its inception, 
describing strong powers pressuring allies to support missions.14 He lists international 
prestige up to and including inclusion as a new permanent United Nations Security 
Council member; altruistic humanitarian reasons—some states contribute so that they feel 
that they have done their part to contribute to better global norms or even as a payment in 
the event that they are in distress; national interests to calm regional unrest boosts the 
contributing nation’s national security by preventing refugee influxes or unrest in similar 
communities within their borders; monetary or material benefits such as donations of 
equipment and UN payments for troop participation; and experience for the military in 
operations and in learning to follow constitutional rule.15 Arturo Sotomayor lists the 
following factors as motivating agents for states to become involved in UN 
peacekeeping: 1. States undergoing a democratic transition seek to align with 
international organizations to provide elites with socializing opportunities to the new 
norms; 2. States undergoing a democratic transition need to demonstrate stability for 
future international investments and commitments; 3. Accelerating civil-military relations 
also discussed by Findlay; and 4. A monetary incentive as demonstrated by Findlay.16 
Sotomayor refutes the claims of Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse that illiberal and 
authoritarian states will be socialized into adopting more liberal norms through its 
interactions with the UN and its peacekeeping missions by showing case studies of 
authoritarian states that have deployed troops to peacekeeping operations and how the 
personnel have not returned to their home states and spread the ideals imbibed while on 
peacekeeping missions.17  
                                                 
14 Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7. 
15 Ibid., 7–10. 
16 Arturo C. Sotomayor, The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2014), 25–37 
17 Sotomayor, The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper, 3 and 25. 
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2. China and Policy toward UN Peacekeeping 
Yongjin Zhang outlines the slow evolution of the Chinese policies.18 Zhang 
proposes that China’s attitude and reaction to UN peacekeeping operations can be seen in 
four phases: Phase I condemnation from 1950–1971, Phase II non-interference from 
1971–1981, Phase III cooperation from 1982–1988, and Phase IV participation, from 
1989 to the present.19 Zhang’s outlines how China has slowly and deliberately modified 
its policy as its role in world politics has evolved.  
Others have examined whether China intends to continue to support global norms 
or at some time in the future to subvert them through their analysis of China’s 
participation in PKOs. One line of argument suggests that the UN’s policy of 
“responsibility to protect” is in conflict with China’s belief in state sovereignty and may 
lead to a reduction in support for UN peacekeeping operations  
These scholars suspect that China will work to block UN peacekeeping in the 
United Nations, or even worse sabotage the system from within, by gaining international 
influence and greater access. Realists often view China as “too big, proud, and 
independently minded for America to ‘tame’ or ‘manage.’”20 John Lee seeks to 
demonstrate China’s interests and motivations are often contrary to America’s and that 
the two are actually engaged in a “strategic competition.”21 The strategic competition 
scholars view national interests in terms of resource attainment as significant motivation. 
Others argue, by contrast, that China will embrace the new norms and become 
even more integrated in the global political system. In this line of thinking China is 
seeking to expand its influence, but if properly enticed, willing to work within the current 
parameters of the UN. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang argue that greater engagement 
with China will lead to improved cooperation and less ambiguity in the policies of China 
                                                 
18 Yongjin Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” 
International Peacekeeping, 3:3 (1996), doi: 10.1080/13533319608413620, 1. 
19 Ibid., 2. 
20 John Lee, “Reaching the Limits: China as a Responsible Power,” Project 2049 Institute, July 
2016, 10. 
21 Ibid., 7. 
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toward UN peacekeeping.22 The positive engagements will pull China to accept global 
norms and become less recalcitrant. This is an identity argument that seeks to prove that 
as China is brought into the global norm it will see itself as more invested in 
supporting it. 
Complicating the issue of identification with global norms is the fact that China’s 
self-identity is split: Fung observes that its dual roles as both a great power and a 
developing state give it multiple responsibilities and perspectives on the role of the 
United Nations in conflict resolution.23 The great powers focus on attempts to quell 
violence and have pushed human rights as an agenda for peacekeeping operations. 
Developing states often prefer less oversight and greater state sovereignty in subduing 
internal disputes. China is vulnerable to appeals on policy, if the entreaties do not 
interfere with core interests, by attacking China’s role in either of these two identities. 
There is a middle ground in the debate between strategic competition versus 
increased engagement. Chien-pin Li argues that China has always acted in a pragmatic 
methodical manner to reduce risks. In essence, China’s peacekeeping effort have been 
consistent with its policies of non-intervention.24 China will continue to act in its own 
best interest and will not quickly change directions unless it has deliberated on the effects 
of the policy change. 
The majority of the literature available simply describes the changes in Chinese 
policies not fully evaluating potential causal factors in light of what typically motivates 
states to participation in peacekeeping. The causal factor of communist ideology as a 
deciding factor is glossed over in the literature as a potential causal factor in the initial 
phases of opposition. When China becomes a member of the Security Council, the 
literature does not use communist ideology as a causal factor in determining why China 
moved to abstaining from voting on UN PKOs. The sudden shift from opposition to non-
                                                 
22 Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and 
the Policy Implications,” SIPRI Policy Brief, February 2009, 1 and 3. SIPRI. 
23 Courtney Fung, “What Explains China’s Deployment to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 
International Relations of Asia Pacific 16 (2015): 411 and 432–33. 
24 Chien-pin Li, “Norm Entrepreneur or Interest Maximizer?: China’s Participation in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations 2001–2010,” China and International Journal 9.2 (2011), 327. Project Muse.  
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interference is a more significant shift than moving from cooperation to participation. 
The potential causal factor of security interests is discussed heavily by some authors but 
not in a systematic way. The claims in the literature have specific examples but are not 
quantitatively analyzed for greater patterns. The literature does not give China much 
credit as a state interested in human rights. China’s media and leadership assert such 
claims, but the significance that China places on state sovereignty has often conflicted 
both domestically and internationally with any claims to humanitarian concerns. The 
fourth claim of identity has some traction in the literature, with Courtney Fung 
specifically assigning it significance. Finnemore’s claims of the fluidity of identity and 
interests leads credence to this as being a potentially significant causal factor in China 
changing its policy towards PKOs. Lastly, the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations 
will potentially show that the conditions that initially prohibited China from participating 
have been removed by improved organization practice within the UN. In particular, the 
more stringent international norms and greater restraints put on the great powers by 
improved oversight and norms provided China with the confidence to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. The literature that claims the causal factor of a socializing 
effect for civil-military relations would not be a significant justification for China to 
participate in peacekeeping operations as they have used mostly logistical support 
personnel and not combat units. In addition, the history in China of using combat units 
against their own people makes this an unlikely justification for China to become more 
involved in PKOs. The monetary benefits to China are not significant as China is also one 
of the large financial contributors to peacekeeping operations. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on the literature review above, two central causal factors will be examined 
as the reason for the change in Chinese foreign policy from opposition to guarded 
support: self-interest as it relates to Chinese security and China’s self-identity. This thesis 
will assess the relative weight of each factor in moving China along its evolution across 
the four phases of posture toward PKOs described by Zhang as follows.  
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1. Realist Security Concerns 
If self-interest was the dominant factor, then China would seek participation in 
international organizations that could provide future protections. China is interested in 
securing its national interests then China would leverage its participation and support to 
peacekeeping missions to ensure material benefits such as favorable extractive trade 
deals. Or improve its international status such as the recognition of the People’s Republic 
of China over the Republic of China in Taiwan.  
2. Constructivist Identity Building 
If identity is a key factor in determining Chinese participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations, then how China sees itself will determine if international 
pressures from either the “global south” with China as a role model and example to 
follow, or pressures from the “great powers” pressing for a responsible partner would be 
highly influential in policy decision making. China’s dual identity make it susceptible to 
different pressures to conform to norms of either identity. When the norms of both 
identities align China will likely easily conform to decisions; however, when the norms 
are not aligned China will be hesitant to make a decision and may delay decisions and 
participation.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will adopt a historical narrative approach to examine the relative 
weight of potential causal factors for the changes in Chinese policy toward UN 
peacekeeping. This thesis will adopt and be organized along Zhang’s categorization of 
the four phases of China’s evolution toward peacekeeping operations. For each of the 
transitions between the phases the thesis will examine when and how China changed 
policy in the context of geo-political events and domestic political movements and 
hypothesize which of the causal factors of self-interests or identity had the greatest 
influence on those changes in policy towards UN peacekeeping operations. Historical 
analysis will lead to conclusions about which factors influence China the most in its 
relations with the UN and peacekeeping operations. In concluding, the thesis will 
examine the extent to which China has reshaped UN peacekeeping policy. The 
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involvement and level of commitment will give credence to China’s view of their role as 
participants or as a leader interested in developing and shaping UN peacekeeping policy 
or as opponents.  
The literature on the evolution and the factors motivating states to become 
involved in peacekeeping operations is well developed and with many conflicting 
opinions on which one is the primary and why. Particular attention is given to a 
motivating factor in separate works. The complete exploration of all factors in one work 
is missing. This thesis will examine two main factors and place it in the context of its 
evolution to assess the importance that each may have had in changing the policies of the 
China. 
United Nations spreadsheets and source documents will demonstrate the quantity 
of personnel submitted to support UN peacekeeping operations. Chinese official 
communications will further demonstrate changes in policy and any potential friction 
between UN policy and Chinese policy.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I has recapped the major 
questions and the significance of the thesis, and reviewed the literature on peacekeeping 
justifications and on China’s participation in peacekeeping. Chapter II will explore the 
history of peacekeeping and its current form in the United Nations. This chapter will lay 
out in more detail the range of motivations of the different states to become involved in 
peacekeeping operations. Chapters III will be the main empirical chapters of the thesis 
examining the four phases: phase 1 condemnation (1950–1971), phase II non-interference 
(1971–1981); phase III of cooperation (1982–1988), and phase IV participation (1989 to 
present). Each of these sections will more fully characterize China’s posture and behavior 
toward PKOs and assess the relative weight of the casual factors in determining these 
outcomes. Chapter IV will conclude by providing as summary assessment of the main 
motivations behind China’s involvement in international peacekeeping; and reflect on the 
implications for Chinese and U.S. foreign policy more generally. 
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II. PEACEKEEPING NORMS AND APPLICATION IN THE UN 
This chapter argues that norms of state intervention in conflict with peacekeeping 
forces underwent a transformation after the Cold War. There are two main arguments that 
will be discussed in regards to peacekeeping and they are the Westphalian and post-
Westphalian points of view. The Westphalian camp argues that state sovereignty is 
paramount and that interference in domestic affairs is to be avoided.25 The post-
Westphalians argue for intervention in domestic affairs, as states that act aggressively 
against their domestic population will have no compunction in acting against neighboring 
states. In addition, the domestic instability can influence instability across borders as 
refugees and international criminal syndicates smuggle people and weapons into the 
conflict area.26 This chapter provides a general background of peacekeeping and then 
goes into detail of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War and after. Table 1 demonstrates 
the evolution of UN peacekeeping from the dominant thought and how it impacted the 
method of peacekeeping.  
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This chapter will illustrates that as the UN has transitioned from a Westphalian to a post-
Westphalian interpretation of peacekeeping norms, and the following chapter will 
demonstrate how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has also followed the changing 
norms, though more cautiously.  
A. FORMATION OF PEACEKEEPING NORMS 
There are two main arguments that will be discussed in regards to peacekeeping 
are the Westphalian and post-Westphalian points of view. The Westphalian camp argues 
that state sovereignty is paramount and that interference in domestic affairs is to be 
avoided.27 The Westphalian peacekeeping operations are generally established to 
separate a conflict with a government and a rebel group within a state. The post-
Westphalians argue for intervention in domestic affairs, as states that act aggressively 
against their domestic population will have no compunction in acting against neighboring 
states.28 The post-Westphalian peacekeeping operations are often in a fragile states and 
incorporate a “multifunctional [approach], with political, humanitarian, social and 
economic components requiring civilian experts and relief specialists to work in parallel 
with soldiers.”29 The lines between the two points of view remain drawn on Cold War 
ideological boundaries with “Westphalian supporters, newly independent states, Russia, 
and China, while post-Westphalians include, the U.S., Canada, Britain, France, and 
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, such as International Crisis Group add 
Human Rights Watch.”30 These arguments frame the normative changes that the UN 
undergoes and how it responds to peacekeeping missions. 
Defining peacekeeping is problematic as determining the rules of employment. 
Weapons have been named after this term, the MX missile “peacekeeper” and the Colt 
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28 Ibid., 1–2. 
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Peacemaker to name a couple, thus implying a deterrent value to peacekeeping.31 
Invading militaries have labeled their forces as peacekeepers as well—the U.S. named 
their troops the Caribbean Peace Keeping Forces in the operation in Grenada.32 Leaders 
suggest that through the use of force peace can be won. How individuals use the term 
peacekeeping, “seems to contradict the whole notion of peace, much less the idea that 
such a condition should be preserved.”33 The nature of peace is seen as fragile, and it 
must be actively protected through deterrence or violence. 
The UN delineates a “spectrum of peace and security activities including 
peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace 
building.”34 The current UN description of peacekeeping explains it as, “one among a 
range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to 
maintain international peace and security throughout the world.”35 Peacekeeping 
operations are formed in response to an incident that has caused largescale loss of life.36 
The common definition of peacekeeping today is “any international effort involving an 
operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of 
longstanding disputes.”37 The international component provides legitimacy to the 
operation as a unilateral approach can be seen as interest based. The UN has been 
criticized because many of its missions have terminated the armed conflict, but have done 
little to resolve the dispute, leaving the potential for a renewal of hostilities should the 
UN pull out. 
As the concept, Westphalian principle of state sovereignty took hold it became 
more common for arbitration to be used to reduce conflict. The lesser powers encouraged 
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the great powers to view conflict under a new norm. Great Powers were pressured to 
reduce what was previously seen as their right to use force against smaller powers. This 
concept, of international relations based on legal precedence, instituted a norm change. 
The new customs led to further additional alterations in norms to permit arbitration of 
conflict.38 Arbitration as a means of resolving international disputes seems counter to the 
interests of great powers. Many neo-realist international relations scholars argue that the 
great powers would be loathed to constrain themselves to arbitration, yet the norms of 
peaceful resolution of disputes have in fact taken hold.39 This is even more surprising, as 
the great powers often worked together to observe one another and act as checks on each 
other with little coordination and joint planning when it came to peacekeeping 
interventions.40 Martha Finnemore, an international relations constructivist scholar, 
points out “over time, states construct rules among themselves about when intervention is 
legitimate or necessary. These rules are not divorced from power or interests. To the 
contrary, rules about intervention are strongly, if not entirely, shaped by the actions of 
powerful states that actually have the capacity to intervene.”41 These independent, yet 
mutually reinforcing, norms each bolster one another “as part of a highly structured social 
context.”42 Changes in one set of norms may necessitate “logical or ethical” changes in 
another set.43 
The transition in normative values from state sovereignty to the belief in the 
necessity in intervention has changed. In addition the method of delivery peacekeeping 
has changed from unilateral intervention to the point that only international organizations 
are considered legitimate.44 Unilateral peacekeeping interventions now lack the 
legitimacy of multilateral organizations and are questioned. This multilateral force was 
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preferred to be a UN force made up of impartial states.45 With these new norms, the post-
Westphalians called for the bolstering UN peacekeeping. Some post-Westphalian 
scholars argue that the UN needs an autonomous force with specific capabilities, or at the 
very least the UN should codify members’ troop contributions to support potential 
peacekeeping operations.46 
Peacekeeping is also difficult to define and operationalize international relations. 
The predominant realist international relations theories discuss rational actors 
determining their interests and seeking to build security. The concept of one state using 
its resources to provide support to another state that does not have security implications 
was out of step with the majority of realist scholars. Constructivists began investigating 
other potential justifications for peacekeeping operations. When researchers review cases 
of humanitarian intervention they frequently hypothesize the following reasons as 
justification: self-interest which can be security concerns by improving international 
support against a rival, preventing refugee influxes, or taming civil unrest in similar 
ethnic communities.47 Financial self-interest can be either through resources gained from 
the host state, monetary or material benefits such as donations of equipment and UN 
payments for troop participation.48 These benefits can be used to improve domestic 
spending to increase their domestic legitimacy.49 The ability to send domestic rivals to a 
type of unofficial exile to improve domestic security for the regime.50 States undergoing 
a democratic transition need to demonstrate stability for future international investments 
and commitments and participation in international organizations can provide the 
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impression of stability and commitment to norms.51 States participate in peacekeeping to 
provide experience for the military in operations and in learning to follow constitutional 
rule.52 In addition, states undergoing a democratic transition seek to align with 
international organizations to provide elites with socializing opportunities to new 
norms.53 Justifications for humanitarian altruistic issues center on identity. States may 
identify with people impacted in foreign country.54 The identity of the state indicates that 
it should respond to a humanitarian crisis.55 Other states contribute so that they feel that 
they have done their part to contribute to global norms.56 
These justifications do not tell the whole story. As Alex Bellamy and Paul 
Williams point out, “the existing literature suggests that previous attempts to theorize 
why states provide UN peacekeepers are incapable of accounting for the wide variations 
in state behavior largely because they rely on one or two causal factors.”57 The UN 
Secretary General noted that states work in the UN peacekeeping can be divided into 
three categories: troop contributors, financial contributors, and mandate approvers.58 
Within those categories, it is even more complicated as the size and quantity of the 
contributions to UN peacekeeping can be additional factors in determining the level of a 
state’s participation.59 Several states send token contributions of one or two people to just 
a few peacekeeping operations. Equating the token contributors on the same level of 
states that consistently contributes hundreds of troops across multiple operations is 
problematic and can lead to misleading conclusions. 
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B. INTERESTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR PEACEKEEPING 
Some theories indicate that states contribute to UN peacekeeping operations 
because they receive a financial benefit. There is a shift to developing states to provide a 
majority of the force for a UN peacekeeping operations. In 1990, three of the five top 
peacekeeping contributors were western states.60 In December of 2016, the highest 
ranked western power is number 24.61 The donating states receive a payment from the 
UN for each day the soldier executes the UN mission, and the UN pays at a higher rate 
than the state pays their soldier at home.62 States are able to shift the burden of the cost of 
a soldier from the state to the UN. In addition, the UN provides for training of the 
personnel. Often times, the states receive donated equipment for the mission as well.63 
States are able to get military training, experience, and equipment at no cost to them; and 
they are able to shift the money they would have channeled into the military into 
domestic spending. This serves to increase the state’s legitimacy at home and reduces the 
likelihood of a coup. The state is able to placate any domestic concerns by maintaining 
strong domestic investment.64 The domestic investment improves the quality providing 
the regime with legitimacy, which reduces opposition.  
Material and monetary incentives are weak explanations for participation. The 
UN is notoriously slow in making payments, and the payments are often low. For small 
countries the foreign capital can be a boon, but the difficulties and delays in receiving the 
funds often outweigh the benefits. The bureaucratic organization in the UN, which will 
be discussed later, for collecting and distributing funds associated with peacekeeping 
makes timely payments difficult as “Even Fiji has threatened to quit peacekeeping unless 
it is ‘reimbursed’ more promptly.”65 In addition, the contributing state is required to 
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provide six months’ worth of standard UN equipment. This can be cost prohibitive for 
many developing states.66 The developing states’ standard issue and the UN standards for 
general issue can be significantly different and require a large investment in uniform 
items and first aid equipment. In addition, the UN requirements for military personnel 
does not constitute an entire country’s military, and since most countries only provide a 
small amount of personnel. Therefore, a government cannot fully shift the cost of their 
personnel to the UN. 
Some participants in UN peacekeeping operations receive equipment donated by 
stronger states. Pakistan received vehicles from Germany for its role in Bosnia.67 Any 
logistician will tell you what a mixed blessing that is. Vehicles that do not have lines of 
supply for replacement parts will become nothing better than displays with no operational 
value. The author has direct experience with this with the RG-31 Mine Resistance 
Ambush Protected vehicles. Procuring even routine parts in the supply chain for vehicles 
designed and built by foreign manufacturers was extremely difficult in Afghanistan. 
Some states will purchase vehicles for a UN mission with the expectation that that the 
UN will rent the vehicles from them. This is a risk as the peacekeeping mission could be 
discontinued prior to recouping the full cost of the equipment. In addition the investment 
could not pay off, as the equipment could not be well suited to the national defense needs 
of the state after the use with the UN mission.68 
Arguments for participating in peacekeeping operations to provide a state’s 
military with operational experience or to improve civil military relations. These notions 
are also poor at explaining why states would participate in UN peacekeeping operations. 
Arturo Sotomayor demonstrates that states have mixed results as their levels of 
participation vary, some states provide large contingents or staff planners while others 
send only lower ranking personnel.69 The norm changing expectations were not seen in 
many states as their militaries continued to act in illiberal manners and intervene in 
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domestic affairs.70 The expected results of “transparency, accountability … and 
reorient[ation] of officers away from domestic politics” did not occur.71 The placing of 
potential military rivals to state power into peacekeeping operations in order to dislocate 
them from their powerbase is also faulty as many developing states contribute troops and 
not their senior leadership.72 The senior leadership staff is selected separately by the 
UN.73 Those senior officers most likely to initiate a coup are not the ones being sent 
away.  
Some scholars argue that states can improve their national security by 
participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Some scholars note that the leading troop 
contributing states are often engaged in interstate rivalry with a neighbor, and the ability 
to train the military and lack of restrictions on withdrawal enables them to rapidly pull 
troops back in the event of a crisis.74 Return to their state will likely not be as easy as the 
authors imply. In the event of a conflict with another state, the enemy will likely seek to 
attack air capabilities. The UN, in an effort to de-escalate the conflict, will seek to block 
the ingress of additional combatants as well. In addition as the authors note, these states 
are developing and do not have the logistics capability to move large amounts of troops 
themselves and would require assistance. This makes this assumption of quick and easy 
withdrawal from UN duties back to their home country unlikely.  
States frequently refer to the need to protect the international order as justification 
for intervention.75 Civil unrest is feared to spread. Refugees from an intrastate conflict 
can move into another state and develop into a domestic issue for the new host country. 
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As some states have multiple ethnic groups, an ethnic conflict across the border can drag 
the government into a response as it tries to protect its citizens. 
Some researchers argue that small states might fear their security in an anarchical 
system, and seek to create a rule of law to bind stronger powers. For small, less powerful 
states, “a strong, reliable multilateral system is seen as essential, and there has been 
considerable self-interest in preserving the existence and credibility of the UN, to 
maintain the international rule of law and create safeguards against great-power abuse.”76 
Therefore, participation in the UN works as a restraint on the larger powers. Larger great 
powers will no longer be able to arbitrarily use their powers. Secondly, by participating in 
a multilateral organization that same organization will be more responsive in providing 
support should that state be in need. More research will need to be done to determine 
whether participation brought about better results in support of requests from the UN, 
specifically in regards to peacekeeping. 
International prestige is often touted by leaders as they push their countries to 
participate in UN peacekeeping.77 The social construct of international prestige is 
difficult to quantify, and when is it in the interest of the state to demonstrate compliance 
with international norms and more politically beneficial to deride convention and 
demonstrate a strong independent stance.78 Many states deem it in their national interest 
to demonstrate their free will against the status quo. As Martha Finnemore articulates this 
concept presents problems. As she says, “order is material—it comes from the 
distribution of capabilities, with capabilities being understood as material resources … in 
most periods of history, the distribution of capabilities is open to interpretation and that, 
in fact, similar distribution of material capabilities generate different understandings of 
order at different times.”79 There is no way to accurately measure a state’s strengths or 
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weaknesses or its willingness to use its strengths in a given situation. This forces leaders 
to act based on perceptions. At any given time, some leaders might view peacekeeping as 
a method of attaining international prestige, but another leader could come to a different 
conclusion about the future significance of the UN and seek to pull out of UN efforts.  
C. IDENTITY DRIVING ALTRUISTICS AND HUMANITARIAN 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING 
Gary Bass discusses identity as a key factor in determining whether a state will 
decide to intervene in a conflict. He demonstrates that a nation which has a similar 
identity with the victims is more likely to intercede in another state with a humanitarian 
mission.80 Support to other peoples in other states grew from ethnic and national 
identities to include a connection based on shared humanity.81 Bass shows how the 
writings of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke transformed the way some elites viewed 
identity, changing their allegiance from ethnic or civic to that of a larger human 
connection.82 Martha Finnemore echoes this theory by stating “who is human has 
changed, that is, who can successfully claim humanitarian protection from strong states 
has changed.”83 She argues that early interventions were often by strong power against 
weak powers. Many of the early humanitarian interventions were to support “white 
Christians against non-Christians. Over time intervention has evolved to include mostly 
non-white non-Christians.84 One of the key roles in developing the ties between the 
victims and the group seeking intervention is the media.85 The media develops the 
linkages between peoples on a human level creating the impetus for action to help the 
people in need. The media and international organizations created empathy with the 
others and this had an effect on behavior.86  
                                                 
80 Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, 19. 
81 Ibid., 20. 
82 Ibid., 22. 
83 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force 53. 
 84 Ibid., 53. 
85 Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, 25. 
86 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, 144. 
 22 
These normative changes in state behavior were developed over time. Changes in 
international behavior is tied to changes in state sovereignty and human rights norms.87 
The Westphalian argument of state sovereignty has frequently been challenged when 
states felt compelled to intervene on the behalf of perceived victims to whom they most 
related. Bass and Finnemore show international interventions in the 1840s when the 
Westphalians arguments held the most weight. The understanding of norms “change the 
way state decision makers understand what is desirable and how to attain it.”88 The 
importance of human rights over state sovereignty in determining whether a state was to 
intervene in a peacekeeping operations used to be more tied to who was the victim and 
who was the aggressor, identity. The definition of threats to international peace and 
security were modified to include antidemocratic governments and human rights 
abusers.89 Finnemore explains: 
These changes in understandings about humanity and sovereignty 
obviously do much more than change humanitarian intervention. They 
alter the purpose of force broadly in world politics, changing the way 
people think about the legitimate and effective uses of state coercion in a 
variety of areas. Understandings that shape social purpose do not exist in a 
vacuum. Social purpose is formed by a dense web of social understandings 
that are logically and ethically interrelated and, at least to some degree 
mutually supporting.90 
Social movements led to changes in the interpretation and implementation of laws which 
“were crucial in transforming individual-level affect and cognitive changes into larger 
social structures.”91 These social movements created multilateral organizations which 
worked to change norms that redefined legitimate intervention practices.92 
Norway was an early leader in UN peacekeeping operations. Having been 
occupied throughout much of its history, it initially sought to establish international rules. 
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Recently, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed the reasons for 
participating in peacekeeping operations by stating, “This policy is based on a spirit of 
solidarity and long term perspective…”93 Norway has sought to create an identity where 
they were connected to the global norms under the UN and attempted to foster that by 
producing “good works” under that system. Italian participation in peacekeeping is often 
equated to compliance with humanitarian doctrine concern for status, and protecting its 
national interests.94 A British High Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations 
reported that the United Kingdom needed to increase its participation in peacekeeping 
operations or “the United Kingdom’s voice in international affairs will lose authority.”95 
The identity of the state is referred to frequently as justification for participating in 
peacekeeping operations.  
D. UN PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURES 
The structures and organizations of the UN impacts how peacekeeping operations 
are created, manned, and equipped. Limitations within the UN creates restrictions and 
constraints on the UN that has implications on peacekeeping employment and the forces 
selected. This section examines the evolution of the UN as it navigated the Cold War and 
the transformation of norms. 
1. The Organizations of the UN as it Applies to Peacekeeping 
The United Nations, like its predecessor the League of Nations, is designed to 
provide collective security to its members; however, the UN has some inherent flaws in 
the organization that makes responding to a threat difficult. Although the UN charter 
called for collective security, it did not specifically address peacekeeping or 
peacekeeping operations signed in 1946.96 The UN is divided into two main bodies: the 
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General Assembly and the Security Council. The Security Council is the organization 
that is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council has 
five permanent members and ten rotating positions.97 The five permanent members were 
the major Allied powers during World War II: the Republic of China (ROC), the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), France, the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), and the United States. The UN 
framework was designed to give the five major Allied powers control, with each having 
veto power on the Security Council. A veto by any one of these five will prevent a 
resolution: otherwise a majority vote will suffice to pass. This resolved the unanimous 
vote requirement that hamstrung the League of Nations. The Security Council is 
responsible for requesting peacekeeping operations from the Secretary General. The 
General Assembly has pushed peacekeeping operations through when the Security 
Council has reached an impasse.  
The requirements for UN peacekeepers meant that the UN had to create a system 
to manage its responses. The General Secretary initially placed peacekeeping operations 
under the responsibility of two under-secretaries without portfolio for Special Political 
Affairs.98 It was not until 1991, when the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was 
finally established as a separate organization within the UN.99 The many responsibilities 
and aspects of peacekeeping operations had been divided up among the pre-existing 
organizations within the UN.100 The Special Political Affairs sections planned missions. 
The Special Political Affairs had no voice in the command and execution of a mission 
nor were they consulted for coordinating instruction for negotiations to reduce the 
conflict.101 Inversely, the commander of the mission was not consulted on the plan 
developed by the Special Political Affairs section that he was tasked with enforcing.102 
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The responsibility of the daily operations fell to the Field Operations Department, 
creating a third bureaucratic entity to navigate.103 The Secretary General recruits member 
states for forces while the commander is appointed separately. The result is the 
commander does not meet their troops often until deployment.104 With the increase in the 
number of missions, the UN sought to bring all manner of peacekeeping functions into 
one organization, creating a disjointed network that often provided diverging guidance 
and provided no unity of command. Figure 1 demonstrates the current structure. 
 
Figure 1.  United Nations Peacekeeping Authority Demonstrating 
Command and Control105 
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2. How a UN Peacekeeping Operation Originates 
The UN guidance and operating procedures are now formalized and illustrate how 
a mission is proposed, approved, manned, equipped, executed, and reconstituted in the 
2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.106 The UN 
continues to re-evaluate the process and seek improvements. A state can request the UN 
to provide a peacekeeping force or even the General Assembly. The current process for a 
William Durch outlines an ideal administrative process for the formation of UN 
peacekeeping force:  
1. The UN Security Council recommends that the Secretary General send 
afield survey teams to attempt to bring both sides of a conflict to 
negotiations. 
2. The survey team reports back whether or not a peacekeeping operation is 
supported by both sides. If both sides deny, then peacekeeping is no longer 
an option and the Security Council will then vote on a peace enforcement 
operation. 
3. The Security Council develops mission parameters. 
4. The Security Council directs Secretary General to create a plan for size, 
structure, duties, and timing of the peacekeeping operation. 
5. The Office of Special Political Affairs and Field Operations Division 
develop a plan. 
6. The Security Council approves plan. 
7. Field Operations Division develops a budget plan. 
8. The Special Peacekeeping unit reviews the budget plan. 
9. Presentation of the budget plan to the Financial Committee of the General 
Assembly. 
10. Within the General Assembly, the Fifth Committee reviews the budget 
plan. 
11. Fifth Committee submission to the General Assembly for approval. 
12. The Secretary General solicits forces to support the operation. 
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13. The forces assemble and train prior to deployment. 
14. The forces move to the conflict area.107 
This process enables a mission to be established. Westphalian who are more 
likely to oppose current iterations of peacekeeping often intercede before step one to 
prevent a recommendation from coming from the Security Council, or during step six by 
vetoing s plan instead of approving it. 
3. Constraints and Restraints on UN Peacekeeping 
The UN budgeting cycle can be an obstacle to timely and effective deployment of 
peacekeepers. The UN does not create budgets for peacekeeping operations. Each 
mission assesses dues from member states.108 The UN funds each operation separately 
and only for a short duration, which frequently requires multiple renewals. This process 
results in arrearages being delivered to UN member states twice a year for each UN 
peacekeeping operation.109 If the request is not in the budget cycle of the country, then 
there can be delays in the UN receiving its funding. For example, the single largest 
financial contributor, the United States, of the total UN budget provides a single payment 
in the last fiscal quarter. Therefore, the UN receives 25% of its total budget in the 4th 
quarter. This means the UN does not have that money upfront so it can begin 
provisioning a peacekeeping operation immediately. In addition, the UN cannot borrow 
money.110 These impediments mean that the UN is not in a position to rapidly respond to 
a situation where peacekeepers would be warranted. 
Costs associated with the initial deployment and sustainment of equipment 
impairs the rapid deployment of peacekeepers.111 The UN views its peacekeeping 
operations as contingency missions and does not forecast or develop logistical or 
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maintenance plans for current or future equipment.112 The UN also experiences delays 
because the troops and equipment are often donated separately.113 Troops are often from 
the developing world while the equipment donated is often from western Europeans and 
the United States. The troops require some training to learn how to operate the equipment 
prior to using it in their assigned operations. UN requires, an often near Western standard 
of equipment, especially in regards to medical care. However, a significant bulk of the 
costs for operations are on the troop contributing states themselves.114 A soldier 
contributed to the UN is expected to show up with enough basic issue clothing and 
equipment to not need sustainment for six months. The first aid kits should be up to 
western standards of aid, and the equipment must be in functional condition. These 
requirements mean that many developing states choose not to provide troops as the costs 
are prohibitive, and many Western states also choose to not contribute troops as they feel 
the standards are too low.  
Another constraint on effective peacekeeping is the perception of legitimacy. 
There are two key factors for peacekeeping legitimacy: capability and neutrality. The UN 
has, at times, struggled with methods of fielding a force capable of executing the mandate 
and in creating the appearance of neutrality. 
The peacekeepers convoluted chains of command sometimes contradicted the 
appearance of neutrality. Peacekeepers often report back to their home country for 
guidance. The ability of the home country to impart direction to its personnel supporting 
a peacekeeping operation could create a perception that the strict neutrality had been 
violated.115 UN peacekeeping operations with vague mandates were often an indication 
of the major powers interests not agreeing on a specific plan for the mandate.116 The 
divergent great power interests forced the writers of the mandates to use language that 
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each side could settle on. This approach could benefit the peacekeeping forces because 
the ambiguity allowed time for states to build consensus, or it even permitted states to 
“lend support without endorsing.”117 States could accentuate the portions that met their 
interests and downplay the negatives enabling broader state participation. 
E. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
The norms for peacekeeping have changed overtime. Peacekeeping practices and 
UN employment of peacekeeping operations have evolved in response to changing 
norms. Westphalian arguments dominated UN thoughts and influenced its practices until 
the fall of the Soviet Union. This evolution is demonstrated in UN peacekeeping 
operations during the Cold War focusing on interstate conflicts and modern peacekeeping 
operations predominantly dealing with intrastate conflicts. Humanitarian intervention has 
a long history even prior to the UN; states would have often intervene in the borders of 
other states to aid people.118 The UN has evolved its peacekeeping operations over time 
to match changing norms and power politics after the Cold War.119  
The League of Nations did have a few successful peacekeeping interventions, 
prior to its demise, which provided the parameters for UN peacekeeping. These 
parameters were the requirement for a ceasefire prior to the force arriving, strict 
neutrality, a fact finding to ensure that peacekeeping would be permitted, and the 
authority to negotiate with the parties.120 The goal of peacekeeping forces is to act as a 
buffer between belligerents. The peacekeepers do not hold territory and are present as a 
confidence-building tool in the ceasefire agreement; they often lack resources to perform 
the actual enforcement.121 Peacekeepers are often tasked with patrols to find violations of 
agreements, observe withdrawals, resolve conflicts, perform some law and governmental 
functions, and pursue humanitarian efforts such as providing health services.122 
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1. Westphalian Norms’ Pre-eminence during the Cold War 
There was an escalation of conflicts, during the Cold War, along interstate 
boundaries and the UN engaged in peacekeeping operations to mitigate those. These 
operations fit into the Westphalian norms of the pre-eminence of state sovereignty. The 
geopolitical pressures during the Cold War saw the collapse of traditional empires and 
the dividing of areas of influence into western aligned, communist aligned and non-
aligned states. The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States saw 
developing states receiving aid in order to join one side or another. Some adroit states 
were able to play the two Cold Warriors off of one another and receive aid from both.  
The first test of UN peacekeeping came with the fall of the colonial empires. The 
conflicts between nationalist movements and colonial empires created political and 
humanitarian crises that were greater than the newly independent states could handle.123 
The UN did not have peacekeeping policies initially. The UN created mandates to 
provide peacekeepers to separate the exiting colonial powers from the newly created 
national governments and their fighters. European Empires were losing legitimacy in 
their former colonies and no longer capable of exerting force across the globe. The UN 
applied Westphalian principles of state sovereignty to the countries that were forming in 
conflict to their old colonial rulers and internally such as the operations in Congo, 
Angola, Namibia, India-Pakistan, West New Guinea, and Cypress.124 Other Cold War 
conflicts flared up as the Soviet Union and the United States vied for supremacy in 
Lebanon, Yemen, and Israel- Egypt.125 
The UN peacekeepers were deployed to stop interstate conflicts along borders of 
these newly independent states. The poorly defined borders were frequently contested as 
each side vied for control of territory and the resources it contained. Belligerent nations 
were often supported by the superpowers. This meant that a small border war had the 
                                                 
123 Durch, “Introduction,” in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative 
Analysis, 1. 
 124 United Nations, Peace Keeping Operations, List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2013, 
accessed 21 September 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf. 
 125 Ibid. 
 31 
potential to escalate into a superpower war. The superpowers fearing the consequences 
sought the help from the UN to de-escalate tensions.  
2. Post-Westphalian Dominance after the Cold War 
UN Peacekeeping evolved again during the Cold War.126 The two superpowers 
acted as stabilizing agents in their support for developing states, during the Cold War. 
The power battle for resources and international prestige, ended when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. The United States and the now Russian Federation retrenched on their foreign 
policy commitments, no longer provided the support to the developing world they once 
did. The developing world no longer held the strategic importance to the superpowers. 
This re-evaluation of vital interests left some of the fragile states on the periphery without 
the support they once received and so badly needed to maintain control of their 
populations. This retrenchment left some states in disarray without a patron. The disarray 
has led to a significant increase in UN peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold 
War. 
The post-Cold War saw a proliferation of intrastate conflicts. The UN underwent 
a norm change away from the priority of state sovereignty favored by the Westphalians to 
that of individual human rights as called for by the post-Westphalians. The UN has 
adopted new norms that call for greater intervention into domestic affairs of a state and 
has responded by becoming more involved in intrastate conflicts.  
Post Westphalian arguments for the inclusion of human rights and the concept of 
the responsibility to protect civilians is a newer debate that has gained traction in the UN 
and is now being included in mandates.127 The Western powers that have come to 
dominate UN politics in the post-Cold War have actively inserted these notions into UN 
peacekeeping mandates. The UN has been responsive to the great powers. Of the 26 
major peacekeeping operations, six were initiated by the Security Council, and seven 
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were brokered behind the scenes by the United States.128 Slightly over half of all 
peacekeeping operations were initiated by the major powers.129 The UN has been 
attentive to the lessons learned and modified its practices to meet the superpower 
constraints. 
The post-Cold War era of peacekeeping operations came after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. This development led to a four-fold increase in UN peacekeeping 
operations by 1992 as shown in Figure 2.130  
 
Figure 2.  The Number of UN Peacekeeping Operations Approved by the UN per 
Year 1971–2016.131  
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Post-Westphalians have urged the UN to become more adept at conflict 
prevention. Several UN General Secretaries, beginning in 2001, urged studies and 
practices to be enable the UN to act to prevent humanitarian crisis. A nongovernmental 
organization, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) established used the General Secretary Kofi Annan’s call to develop a three 
pronged plan to reduce man-made humanitarian conflict.132 The ICISS’s report outlined 
three key responsibilities: “prevent, react, rebuild” which have been summed up as the 
responsibility to protect.133 The 2005 UN World Summit carried out a lively debate 
before ultimately adopting the revised principles.134 Westphalians complained against the 
“internationalization” of a conflict in which neighboring states could request an 
intervention based on undefined and unclear “threats.”135 The second fear of small and 
developing states was that an intervention might legitimize a rebel group and grant them 
negotiating rights.136 The UN again debated the principles again in the General Assembly 
in 2009 agreeing to “continue their consideration of the responsibility to protect but 
stopped short of mentioning any concrete plans for implementation.”137  
Westphalian arguments for prioritizing state sovereignty have been re-evaluated 
in recent years The complex forces acting on fragile states has led to an expanding 
understanding of peace and non-traditional security issues. This has brought about a call 
for more frequent intervention into the domestic matters of states. Martha Finnemore 
explains “states that abuse citizens in massive or systemic ways are now viewed as 
security threats both because the flows of refugees and social tensions that such policies 
create are destabilizing to neighbors and because aggressive behavior internally is seen as 
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an indicator of the capacity to behave aggressively externally.”138 Post-Westphalians 
argue that intervention into the domestic actions of a state are warranted because the 
domestic actions of a state can have repercussion beyond their borders. The notion of 
state sovereignty and equality among states as being paramount is being replaced with 
notions of regional peace and stability. In turn, the requirement for peace and stability has 
brought about the need for greater peacekeeping operations. The UN Peacekeeping 
Guidelines describe how peacekeeping operations have evolved from the Westphalian 
model to the post-Westphalian model of peacekeeping: 
A technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has halted, and to assist in the implementing agreements achieved 
by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from 
primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of 
forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many 
elements—military, police, and civilian—working together to help lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace.139 
UN Westphalian models of observing the cease fire are still in effect in India-Pakistan, 
Cyprus, Israel-Egypt, and Lebanon to the 2103 “multidimensional integrated stabilization 
mission in Mali.”140 Post-Westphalians argue that states can and should work to create 
regional security by intervening in inter and intrastate conflicts has been winning out over 
the old Westphalian practices. The understanding of threats to global security have 
changed. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the motivations for states’ participation in peacekeeping operations 
has changed. Early assessments used international relations theory based on neo-realism 
principles which provides geostrategic, economic, or both as the predominant factors.141 
Balance of power theory indicates that “powerful states have always intervened to 
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promote an order or to protect the status quo that suits them.”142 This concept indicates 
that major powers would use their power to manipulate smaller states to ensure that their 
hegemony is secure. Early UN peacekeeping operations often required strong powers 
pressuring allies to support missions. The major powers would not contribute personnel 
to a mission so as to maintain the veneer of neutrality.143 Finnemore argues that realist 
geopolitical power balancing does not adequately address why strong states are involved 
in peacekeeping because interventions occur in states that have limited geostrategic, 
economic importance to the great powers, and therefore do not trigger a national security 
interest for most major powers.144 The major and minor powers continue to support 
peacekeeping operations in regions and countries that do not provide a direct benefit to 
them. 
Peacekeeping operations themselves have evolved over time to match the changes 
in norms. Today, a majority of states consider the most legitimate form of peacekeeping 
as a multilateral approach often through the UN that attempts to maintain its neutrality, is 
limited in the use of force, and is not beholden to any of the major powers. The 
peacekeeping is often torn between the competing ideas of the Westphalians, who place 
state sovereignty as paramount over other considerations, and the post-Westphalians, who 
regard human life as the primary concern. This conflict has shaped how the UN creates a 
peacekeeping mandate and how the UN can deploy its peacekeepers.  
The UN has been evolving the method of creating its peacekeeping forces as well 
as the mandates that drive them. The Cold War heavily influenced what peacekeeping 
operations would be approved and who could execute them. The geo-political pressures 
have caused a change in UN peacekeeping. Early peacekeeping mandates were to use UN 
observers as a buffer for interstate conflicts. The post-Cold War mandates send UN 
peacekeepers to participate in multifaceted humanitarian and state building operations in 
response to the intrastate conflicts. The UN has struggled to create a coherent method of 
handling the increasingly frequent requirements for peacekeepers. The ad hoc recruitment 
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and funding continues to hamper and delay the response of critically needed personnel 
during a humanitarian crisis. Proposals for corrections have begun to gain momentum. 
The UN has created a permanent peacekeeping department, and states are beginning to 
provide trained fast-response forces to the UN. 
The UN will continue to evolve its approaches to peacekeeping in response to the 
geo-political pressures and as influences and lessons learned change. The peacekeeping 
operations of today are often deeply rooted in normative values with many open-ended, 
long-term tasks aimed at aiding failing states. The normative values built into the modern 
mandates expect both the peacekeeping states and the states receiving aid to accept the 
normative values.  
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III. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UN 
PEACEKEEPING 
This chapter examines the dominant factors that contributed to changes in 
Chinese foreign policy regarding UN peacekeeping. As described in the introduction, the 
two factors to be examined are self-interest and identity. As discussed in Chapter two, the 
single component of self-interest most influential in changing policy towards 
peacekeeping is security. Also explored in chapter two is the concept of identity as it is 
used to accept norms. This thesis uses Yongjin Zhang’s framework of phases to examine 
and explain how Chinese foreign policy has changed. He describes four phases: phase 1, 
from 1950–1971, as a period of condemnation of all UN peacekeeping efforts; and phase 
2, from 1971 to 1981, as a period of non-interference; phase 3, from 1981–1988, as a 
period of cooperation for UN peacekeeping efforts; and phase 4, from 1988 to the 
present, as a policy of participation. Realist concepts of self-interests as it pertains to 
balance of power theories explain some periods, and constructivist theories on identity 
best explain the change in other periods of Chinese policy towards UN peacekeeping 
operations.  
This chapter will explain that Chinese communist ideology was the dominant 
factor during phase one. These domestic identity factors created external political threats 
that forced the Chinese Communist Party to change its policies. As the political situation 
adjusted to the shifting policies, China became less antagonistic towards UN 
peacekeeping operations during phase two. Phase two was a period of non-intervention as 
China became more integrated into world politics and took a seat in the United Nations at 
the Security Council. Once again, China was limited in its security situation as a détente 
between the U.S. and USSR left it isolated, and it sought to create additional security 
institutions to protect its interests. This enabled China to move from a position of non-
intervention to one of cooperation in regards to UN peacekeeping. As China’s status 
improved and its interests in the world adjusted, China sought to demonstrate that it was a 
“responsible power” and transitioned from cooperation to participation in UN 
peacekeeping beginning in 1988 to the present. The improvements in the Chinese 
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economy and increasing self-assurance in China gave the CCP the impetus to 
demonstrate that China is a “great power” capable of supporting the established 
institutions while at the same time restricting Western power’s influence within the UN. 
China would continue to oppose intrusions on sovereignty by maintaining Westphalian 
principles. China has sought to do this through greater cooperation within the UN 
peacekeeping organizations and institutions. Table 2 demonstrates the dominant factor 
that influenced Chinese policy towards UN peacekeeping operations.  
Table 2.   Dominant Policy Factors Influencing Chinese Foreign Policy 
















Identity Self-interest Self-interest Identity 
 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This section argues that the framework for the Chinese Communist identity as 
seen in phase one of policy towards UN peacekeeping was established through its early 
interaction with western imperial powers and during World War II. Chinese identity in 
the 1700 and 1800s is best described by Zheng Wang when he strings together three 
common descriptions of how the Chinese described themselves and their land into one 
sentence: “Chosen people who lived in a sacred land at the center of the world.”145 
Chinese viewed themselves as special, their culture and heritage had been supreme for 
thousands of years. Other peoples may have conquered them, but the foreigners 
assimilated to Chinese practices and teachings. This identity conflicted with the equally 
centrist British Empire. The British ambassador to China, Lord Macartney, confided in 
someone that he believed the Chinese will see, “the superiority which Englishmen, 
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wherever they go, cannot conceal.”146 This inherent belief in the greatness of each side 
meant that any dealings with one another had a high probability of conflict. The next 
ambassador to China, after Lord Macartney, was not even received by the Chinese 
court.147 The British next sent Lord Napier to negotiate with China, but he quickly 
violated all protocols by heading straight to Canton without first registering his request at 
the correct location with the correct organization.148 Lord Napier believed that his status 
as a British diplomat granted him exemption from Chinese bureaucratic rules and 
traditions. This led the Chinese to boycott all British trade and tensions escalated igniting 
the First Opium War.149 This launched what the Chinese termed as the “Century of 
Humiliation,”150 or repeated Western military incursions into sovereign Chinese territory 
to gain economic and political advantages over the Chinese government. The outbreak of 
the Chinese Civil War saw foreign powers become less overtly obtrusive in Chinese 
politics and began to work more through existing Chinese political organizations rather 
than military incursions.  
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) struggled to attain ascendancy in Chinese 
politics because of the interference of foreign powers. The Chinese Civil War was not 
strictly an internal affair. The world powers picked favorites and attempted to support one 
faction over the other. The National Socialist Party in Germany, the Soviet Union, and 
later the United States all provided support to the Guomindang Nationalist Party at 
different times.151 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) often advised their 
fellow communists in the CCP to compromise with the Guomindang.152 China noted the 
advice to compromise and meek levels of support provided by the Soviet Union. The 
Chinese Civil War, which took a hiatus to unite both the major factions against the 
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Japanese, resumed after World War II (WWII). The CCP’s communist benefactors, the 
USSR, provided limited support, and the Soviets urged the CCP to compromise with the 
Guomindang, even as the U.S. was pouring supplies and equipment into the 
Guomindang.153 The Guomindang received a larger proportion of international assistance 
compared to the CCP. Despite the material advantages of the Guomindang, the CCP was 
able to defeat the Guomindang in the civil war and successfully established the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The losing Guomindang party escaped to Taiwan and 
established the Republic of China (ROC). Just one year after forming, the PRC felt 
compelled to warn the United States and its United Nations allies that the intervention in 
the Korean Civil War would provoke a Chinese intervention if they crossed the border of 
the 38th parallel, as established after WWII. The Chinese provided warnings to the UN 
that they would intervene if the UN forces approached the Yalu River. These warning 
were not heeded and China attacked the UN forces, which prolonged the war for another 
two years.154 
The CCP’s identity, from its inception and throughout its early development, has 
been shaped by international forces. The UN did not concede the realities on the ground 
and failed to transition the Security Council seat from the ROC to the PRC. The Chinese 
and especially the CCP had learned to suspect foreign and international organizations 
intentions with the UN intervention in Korea. This deep distrust, imbedded in the 
Communist ideology with Chinese Characteristics, manifested itself in Chinese foreign 
policy. 
B. PHASE 1, OPPOSITION, 1950–1971: IDENTITY 
This section argues that the communist ideological beliefs framed Chinese foreign 
policy towards UN peacekeeping operations from 1950 to 1971. Liberal constructivists 
theories seek to demonstrate that states like individuals are subject to changes in 
perception. Benedict Anderson describes how nationalism is a cultural creation of 
                                                 
153 Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia, 325. 
154 Chin-Hao Huang, “Principles and Praxis of China’s Peacekeeping,” in China’s Evolving 
Approach to UN Peacekeeping, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (New York: Routledge, 2012), 16. 
 41 
“historical forces” that are forged by political and ideological concepts.155 As Anderson 
details, communities share the experience of time, status, and location, which are then 
transformed into meaning.156 His title Imagined Communities, demonstrates how people 
choose to identify themselves as part of a group despite having only limited actual ties to 
that group. Groups are tied together be their shared understandings of the past. Zheng 
Wang concurs that historical memory is a significant factor in creating identity in 
China.157 Martha Finnemore expands the constructivist theories to apply to international 
relations when she states: “States do not always know what they want. They and the 
people in them develop perceptions of interest and understandings of desirable behavior 
from social interactions with others in the world they inhabit.”158 Peter Sexia describes 
how societies build a collective or shared memory, “the writing of history, and other 
modes of shaping images of the past in the public mind mere,… [encompassing] 
individual and collective understandings of the past, the cognitive and cultural factors 
that shape those understandings, as well as the relations of historical understandings to 
those of the present and future.”159 China built a historical narrative through its control of 
the media and education.  
The Chinese government has outlined the importance of using the media to shape 
culture which in turn provides the party with legitimacy and social control.160 The 
importance of the media in pushing the party/ government message is seen in the 
regulatory stipulation that, “The media has a political role in disseminating correct public 
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opinion, ensuring that development is ‘healthy,’ and morality is maintained.161 The 
government is the final arbiter of correct public opinion, and “although the Chinese 
constitution provides for freedom of expression, it is not enforceable in court.162 The 
Chinese Communist Party is able to design and craft the messages that will be broadcast 
to the Chinese population and block any dissenting voices.  
The Chinese media are controlled by a complex labyrinth of regulations as 
established by “party organs, state departments, state owned enterprises, and industrial 
associations.163 Chinese regulations reject western values that are used to govern the 
media in liberal democracies such as pluralism, impartiality, and free expression.164 The 
Chinese Communist Party created a policy of “public opinion supervision,” in 1987, 
under the premise that the masses must understand the major issues in order to have a 
dialogue.165 The 1989 democracy protest led to a new policy “public opinion 
guidance.”166 The new propaganda chief’s policy guidance encouraged “newspaper 
reports should mainly report and propagate positive matters, criticism should be 
concentrated on items that can be resolved and critical reporting should include 
information on the resolution of the problem.”167 The institution reforms to both structure 
and rules after the democracy movements have been designed to ensure that the 
communist party maintains hegemony over content and the actor who produce and 
distribute public expression.168 Rogier Creemers explains that China’s “aim is not to 
create a framework of rules and principles that clarify the rights and obligations of all 
concerned parties, within which individual actors can pursue their own objectives, but to 
manage the sphere of public communications in support of a specific set of political 
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objectives.”169 This is the antithesis of the interaction between government and media in 
liberal democracies. The Chinese government established a system in which they can 
arbitrarily control the messages produced. Creemers elucidates, “The structuring of media 
governance through administrative regulation has created an environment in which the 
rules can change rapidly and unpredictably. The prioritization of political objectives over 
other interests, combined with a lack of checks, balances, and accountability.”170 The 
media is not free to create its own agency, but instead is forced to produce the message of 
the government. The message, depending on its importance, is either “supervised” to 
ensure that it does stray away from the intent, or the message is “guided” to ensuring that 
it closely aligns with the political goals. 
China combined nationalism with its communism to oppose the UN and its 
peacekeeping efforts. China used the narrative of the “Century of Humiliation” to build a 
common imagined communion of individuals, beyond those who are intimately known, 
with “a deep horizontal comradeship” grounded in cultural connections.171 The average 
Chinese person knows and understands the impact of foreign intervention on Chinese 
history. China has worked to ensure that the concepts of foreign intervention and unfair 
treatment of China has seeped into the national consciousness. This has influenced how it 
has interacted with international organizations such as the UN.  
Chinese identity of being held back by the great powers led them to oppose 
international organizations, like the UN, that were controlled by the great powers. The 
PRC’s initial interactions with the UN combined with its view that the institution was “a 
U.S. controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out 
revolutionary struggles of the world’s people,” clearly indicated an adversarial 
relationship.172 The communist leadership in China repeatedly criticized the UN, 
claiming that the UN was under the influence of “a few big powers; sovereignty of other 
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nations, particularly small ones, is bought and sold there by them like shares.”173 China’s 
condemnation of the UN was based on its past exclusion and fear of the UN once again 
turning its powers against the PRC and the influence that former colonial powers wielded 
within the UN. China’s ideological framework guided their beliefs that the U.S. would 
manipulate the UN peacekeeping operations to oppress groups opposed to the U.S.’s 
interests. 
Post World War II saw two great powers emerge—the U.S. and the USSR—and 
ignite the Cold War.  
The Cold War is a term that characterizes the hostile relationship that 
developed first in Europe and then in Asia and other parts of the world as 
a result of the intensified struggle between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1940s. While loosely employed, “the 
term had an exceedingly important connotation: it called attention to the 
fact that, however acute their rivalry and conflict, the two sides were 
pursuing it by means short of another war and that, it was hoped, they 
would continue to do so.174 
Neo-realists argue that states would seek to align with other states to prevent the growth 
of a regional hegemon.175 The Cold War saw a similar alignment initially as the two 
dominant ideologies divided the world into capitalists versus communists. The more a 
state feels threatened, the more likely it will take action to protect its interests. A separate 
phenomena was taking place, as the colonies began to break free many sought a third 
path: one of nonalignment. Many former colonies, now independent states, did not see 
the benefits of joining the Cold War, despite the invitations, and sought instead to 
develop their own economies. They often rejected the capitalism that had driven their old 
colonial masters and did not see the benefit of a communist style of government.  
The PRC began working with other developing nations and newly de-colonized 
states that were feeling pressured between the bi-polar international diplomacy of the 
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Soviet Union and the United States. China felt the interests of developing countries were 
not just being manipulated in the UN by U.S.’s actions, but also by those of the Soviets: 
“The United Nations has long been controlled by the United States and has today become 
a place where two big powers, The United States and the Soviet Union, conduct political 
transactions.”176 The invitation of the PRC to conferences, such as the Asian-African 
Bandung Conference and the Geneva Conference on Indochina, demonstrates the 
international non-aligned communities’ growing acceptance of the PRC as the legitimate 
representative of the Chinese people.177 Despite some initial reservations about having an 
avidly communist nation at the Bandung Conference in 1955, China successfully 
assuaged the fears of the other conference attendees and helped re-articulate the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as the guiding principles of China’s foreign 
policy.178 The five principles of “mutual respect of territory and sovereignty, mutual non-
aggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence,” were derived from a country that had a semi-
colonial past and feared outside interference.179 This message strongly resonated with 
other states that shared a similar history of colonial control. The PRC built an identity 
around non-alignment.  
The exclusion of the PRC from the UN and the isolation from within the 
communist movement, which will be discussed in the next section, gave China an 
identity as an outsider in the global community. This further permitted the non-alignment 
principles that it adhered to. However, the failure of the Cultural Revolution and 
economic stagnation within China combined with the new Soviet threat pushed the 
Chinese to change their ideological arguments. The “Soviet social-imperialism” became 
the new number one threat and the U.S. status as an enemy was downgraded.180  
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C. PHASE 2, NON-INTERVENTION, 1971–1981: SELF-INTEREST 
Analysis indicates that domestic changes concerning the supremacy of Chinese 
communist thought combined with changing balance of power concerns regarding the 
Sino-Soviet Split created opportunities for China to adjust its foreign policy towards UN 
peacekeeping from 1971 to 1981. China had a strong break from its previous stance of 
opposition to a period of nonintervention from 1971 to 1981 to UN peacekeeping 
operations. The break was a result of an identity shift brought about by the souring of 
foreign relations with the Soviet Union. Vladimir Lenin, as described by M. Kulichenko, 
outlines how important historicism is in understanding foreign relations among states. 
According to Kulichenko, Marxist-Leninist methodology lists some key principles that 
determine international relations: culture is malleable, internal and external events 
contribute to an international relationship, the perspectives of each party will shape a 
relationship, and relationships can be modified over time.181 These principles explain 
how China has modified its foreign policy in regards to UN peacekeeping. These 
pressures created a shift of alliances which ultimately led to China’s inclusion in the UN 
and initiated policies changes towards UN peacekeeping operations.  
The two communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, began fighting over the 
direction of international communism in the late 1950s and eventually resulted in the 
outbreak of military hostilities in 1969.182 China, a developing state, now had an 
adversary that had used force against other communist aligned states on its border. China 
looked for assistance in the international community.183 The PRC looked to balance the 
Soviet threat, and the U.S. was keen to further isolate the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
in the wake of the failure of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China began 
transforming its ideology from being a supporter of global revolution to becoming more 
willing to work within the established global social order.184 The Cultural Revolution 
was an attempt to maintain the iconoclastic communist revolution and to prevent the 
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establishment of vested interests by destroying vestiges of class and emphasizing local 
self-sufficiency.185 The excesses of the Cultural Revolution created a major setback for 
the communist identity.  
The communist leadership re-evaluated its isolating ideological identity in the 
1970s. The Chinese leadership realized that its hardline ideologically driven policies had 
significantly worsened the security predicament. China was now in opposition to its 
erstwhile biggest ally the Soviet Union. The antagonism between the two communist 
powers increased until there was a border skirmish in 1969.186 China determined that its 
security threat was more significant than its ideological differences and worked to create 
a rapprochement with the United States. The China- U.S. rapprochement brought about a 
stronger security position and “opened the way for China’s admission into the United 
Nations.”187  
The admission of the PRC into the UN Security Council altered China’s 
perception of its identity in relation to the UN. China’s outright condemnation of United 
Nations international peacekeeping operations ended in October 1971 when the UN 
revoked the ROC’s ability to represent the state of China and the PRC was given the 
position in the UN.188 China transitioned from being an outsider decrying injustice to a 
full member. The previous identity could not be shed overnight and China compromised 
with a policy of non-intervention in which China would abstain on votes regarding UN 
peacekeeping operations. In the first UN vote for a peacekeeping operation with the PRC 
in the Security Council, in December of 1971, China voiced its opposition to all UN 
peacekeeping operations, but abstained from the vote.189 This policy was later clarified 
with the next vote on a peacekeeping mission in 1973, when China representative, Huang 
Hua, stated that peacekeeping operations “only pave the way for further international 
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intervention and control with the superpowers as the behind-scenes-boss.”190 Hua went 
on to state that because of the requests from the victims of aggression for UN 
peacekeeping forces, “China was not in a position to veto the resolution.”191 In addition, 
the PRC announced that since they opposed peacekeeping operations, it would not 
contribute to the costs incurred in such operations.192 The PRC, now that it was included 
in the UN, saved face by continuing its opposition to UN peacekeeping but thanked the 
establishment by abstaining and allowing the status quo to continue. The PRC’s policy of 
“cooperation through non-interference” constituted three parts: China would not debate in 
the Security Council; China would not veto resolutions; and China would not contribute 
with personnel or financially.193 The PRC did not completely reverse its positions once 
included in the UN, it maintained its identity as a non-aligned country upholding 
Westphalian principles. Despite China’s previous rhetoric of condemnation of the UN, 
the PRC did not act as an impediment to peacekeeping operations. This was in keeping 
with its non-alignment principles; ensuring that it did not side with either of the 
superpowers.194 China maintained its identity as an independent state by not supporting 
the superpowers and also by proclaiming to be helping its fellow developing states by not 
opposing or supporting UN peacekeeping operations.  
D. PHASE 3, COOPERATION, 1981–1988: SELF-INTEREST 
Analysis indicates security concerns continued to guide Chinese foreign policy 
towards UN peacekeeping from 1981 to 1988. Self-interest in the early 1980s pushed the 
PRC to find institutional protection to improve its security. Souring relations with the 
United States and continued animosity with the Soviet Union left China with few global 
partners. China was responding to the Taiwan Relations Act passed in Congress that 
articulated that the U.S. would sell Taiwan weapons of the quantity and quality necessary 
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to defend Taiwan from aggression.195 China re-evaluated its role in the international 
community, especially in respect to the strongly oppositional rhetoric emanating from the 
United States, and its growing requirement for resources to support its expanding 
economy.196 In 1984, China signaled its change in policy when the Chinese deputy 
representative announced in the UN Security Council that China would seek “to 
strengthen the role of the United Nations,” to meet the demand for international 
peacekeeping operations.197 China had made its third transition. This enabled China to 
move from non-intervention in which they did not oppose UN peacekeeping operations to 
a policy of cooperation where China now funded and observed UN peacekeeping 
missions.  
China’s foreign policy is disjointed because of its competing domestic 
requirements. China needs to appear to the world that it is a responsible power in order to 
continue to garner foreign investment and consumption to grow the economy; however, 
Chinese leaders also must demonstrate that they are going to stand up to foreign influence 
to defend Chinese sovereignty and national pride.198 Given the international climate 
China, at its 1982 12th National Congress developed an “independent foreign policy” that 
invested in international organizations to build cooperative security. China demonstrated 
this through a greater commitment to UN peacekeeping.199  
Chinese leadership began affirming UN peacekeeping importance while clearly 
using Westphalian restraints. Liang Yufan, the deputy permanent representative in the 
UN, reaffirmed that the UN has an important role in maintaining peace and security; 
however, it must operate using the principles of state sovereignty as advocated by the 
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Westphalians.200 These principles were echoed by the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang on 
the anniversary of the founding of the UN.  
To demonstrate China’s new found cooperation in UN peacekeeping China began 
approving peacekeeping operations on the Security Council, paying its peacekeeping 
dues, and sending personnel as observers to peacekeeping operations.201 These behavior 
changes clearly indicate that China was moving towards greater acceptance of UN 
peacekeeping norms, while still maintaining strong Westphalian beliefs. The UN Security 
Council brought two new peacekeeping missions to vote during this period and voted in 
favor of both.202  
Chinese leadership balanced its self-interest and identity as a growing power to 
maximize its ability to continue to grow economically and internationally as a respected 
power. The Chinese move from non-intervention to cooperation with UN peacekeeping, 
though only encompassing a small number of votes on operations, was a clear signal that 
China was moving closer to accepting global norms. China was moving from the fringes 
into the center preparing its way for its next major shift in policy. Of the three UN 
Security Council Votes for a peacekeeping operation during this period China abstained 
twice and voted in favor once.203  
E. PHASE 4, PARTICIPATION, 1988–PRESENT: IDENTITY 
Analysis of this period indicates China’s developing identity influenced its 
foreign policy towards UN peacekeeping from 1988 to the present. China deepened its 
commitment to global international norms as it transitioned from its cooperation phase, of 
no longer abstaining in votes and contributing financially to peacekeeping funding, and 
moved to a phase of participation. The PRC’s national interests have expanded beyond its 
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borders into the international arena.204 This expansion has had a corresponding change in 
the identity of China and a re-evaluation of the role that it should have in global politics. 
As Alexander Wendt argues, “what matters is the identities and interests that states bring 
to their interactions and the subsequent impact of the latter on the former.”205 China’s 
view of themselves as approaching great power status as a result of its economic growth 
have pushed China to take its place among the powerful international states.206 The 
PRC’s growing material wealth is not matched in its soft power; the PRC, “lacks 
discourse power in defining international values and goods”; however, the influence of 
the PRC is growing as they demonstrate an alternative model to the liberal western 
view.207 The United Nations and its peacekeeping arm provide China the opportunity to 
demonstrate its great power status to other states by providing large financial and 
increasing quantity of troop contributions, especially when compared to other rich states 
and members of the Security Council, as well to its own people that China has brought 
about a resurgence of Chinese power and influence in the world, all the while upholding 
Westphalian principles.  
The PRC as both a developing and a strong nation enables it to straddle the line in 
peacekeeping operations to be seen and see itself as a state willing and able to help other 
developing states without the concern of political and economic interests. The PRC is 
also able to garner host nation support because of its Westphalian stance, which means it 
will limit international pressure to change the domestic institutions of the host nation. The 
PRC’s fear of western security agreements has kept it out of joining in many agreements. 
Some host nations see the lack of security agreements as a positive as it will preclude 
outside interests from intruding on the peacekeeping operation. The fact that China is not 
tied to many security organizations ensures that it operates through the UN, unlike the 
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United States which has multiple organizations to work through to be able to take actions, 
as was demonstrated in its efforts to block Serbian aggression without UN approval. The 
PRC’s lack of organic power projection capabilities along with its poor integration in 
security agreements limits its ability to build and supply units on foreign duties.208 This 
lack of power projection alleviates fears within the host nation of sustained aggression on 
the part of the PRC. In addition, the PRC’s former colonial past lends legitimacy when 
they provide peacekeeping operations to developing nations.209 Developing nations also 
see the support from the PRC as less divisive as the Western powers often have 
governance requirements associated with their support, but the PRC does not place such 
restrictions.210 Nations in need of assistance are less reluctant to accept support from the 
PRC because of its Westphalian principles and strong stance on state sovereignty issues.  
The PRC has not listed human rights as significant enough justification to support 
UN peacekeeping operations. The PRC has often regarded the western promotion of 
human rights as an attempt at regime change.211 China has feared western willingness to 
instituted regime change believing that they may one day be on the receiving end of one 
of those attempts. China made the declaration at the end of the Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 that, “the politicization of human rights and the 
imposition of human rights conditionalities … constitute a violation of human rights.”212 
China made it clear through this declaration their opposition to the western imposition of 
good governance requirements as factors before granting aid. 
The Chinese Westphalian policy of commitments to the sovereignty of the state 
has been reduced recently. The PRC did not view threats to civilians created by their own 
governments’ as justification for the use of force. The PRC has approved peacekeeping 
forces, but has not approved the use of force by those peacekeepers to stop a belligerent 
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actor from attacking another.213 China approved peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, 
Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia, but opposed the use of force under Chapter VII to stop 
further attacks and prevent further loss of life.214 The growing international pressure to 
intervene in Darfur against the Sudanese government put a lot of pressure on China, 
which had economic and diplomatic ties the government of Sudan. The PRC used its 
leverage with Sudan to get the Sudanese to acquiesce to a joint UN and African Union 
(AU) peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This enabled the PRC to avoid a vote in the UN 
to mandate a peacekeeping operation. The PRC was able to leverage its diplomacy to 
avoid a conflict with western powers that were receiving strong pressure to pursue 
military action against Sudan, a trading partner with China.215  
China has modified its stance on state sovereignty over time. The principle of the 
responsibility to protect has “reframed sovereignty as a responsibility, as opposed to a 
right.”216 China initially opposed the principle in its initial planning phases from 2000–
2005. China participated in the drafting at the UN World Summit and ensured that the 
language was modified to ensure narrow the ability of the UN to invoke peacekeeping or 
enforcement under the UN Charter.217 By 2009 China has adopted the first two of the 
three pillars: 
1. States bear primary protection responsibilities. 
2. The international community should assist to meet their protection 
responsibilities. 
3. The international community should be prepared to use force via the 
UNSC, if peaceful means fail.218 
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China has demonstrated its commitment to the “responsibility to protect” 
principles when it voted to pass and participate in UN mandates for peacekeeping 
operations to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Cote d’Ioire, and 
Timor-Leste that specify “the holding of free and fair elections,” as one of the mission’s 
priorities.219 Many critics of the UN discuss how liberal ideology pervades UN mandates 
for peacekeeping operations. The PRC has overlooked the liberal western influence on 
these UN mandates. The military personnel assigned by the PRC to support the UN 
peacekeeping operation are typically force enablers, not infantry, who drill wells and 
provide health care personnel to improve the conditions for the peacekeepers and the host 
nation citizens.220 The PRC’s UN peacekeeping operations have been supportive of 
human rights and improved the living conditions of the host nations. The PRC maintain 
its Westphalian principles by stressing the responsibility to protect citizens is primarily 
on the state and limiting the UN’s peacekeeping to states that request support. Although 
the PRC often opposes human rights alone, China does improves the humanitarian 
conditions and human rights of host nations through it peacekeeping deployments under 
the UN.  
The PRC began to recognize that UN peacekeeping missions could enhance their 
global reputation and act as a restraint on the west as well as a means of enforcing its 
foreign policy. China has used its ability to veto or provide support to UN peacekeeping 
operations to garner support for its “One China Policy,” blocking missions to Guatemala 
in 1997, and Macedonia in 1999.221 China became more nuanced and approved 
peacekeeping to Haiti in 2004, yet by 2010 when Haiti had not switched recognition from 
the ROC to the PRC, it withdrew support to the mission.222 The PRC attempted to use 
soft power to influence Haiti in a new direction and failed. Rather than reinforcing failure 
by supporting a regime that did not support them, the PRC pulled out of Haiti while it 
was still recovering from the devastation of a massive earthquake. In addition, China has 
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seen how other states have used the UN to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. The 
PRC initially opposed UN operations in Kosovo and witnessed the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) act without UN approval.223 Russia threatened to veto and the 
PRC abstained when it came to vote in the Security Council. The Western Powers used 
the auspices of NATO instead and acted without UN approval. NATO’s action was an 
indication to China that they needed to strengthen the United Nations as a determining 
body and block other multinational actors from intervening in the domestic affairs of 
states. China has, since the NATO intervention, sought to enhance the “relevance and 
authority of the UN,” as the premier agency in which to handle international conflict.224 
China has worked to become strong enough both inside and outside the UN to be able to 
control how peacekeeping operations are committed and to whom. 
In addition, China has established itself as one of the premier locations for 
peacekeeping training. China is capable of hosting international conferences and training 
to prepare peacekeepers for deployment.225 Since developing countries are known for 
committing large numbers of peacekeeping troops, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
augmentation of UN peacekeeping missions in addition to working in developing nations 
improves the knowledge of the security issues in key regions.226 China is gaining key 
knowledge on developing nations through several types of interactions, and they are also 
building operational knowledge by ensuring that the PLA has members gain experience 
as key planners and commanders of joint peacekeeping operations.227 The PRC has been 
able to develop linkages to many nations through positive interactions via its UN 
peacekeeping operations.  
The PRC’s view of the United States as a receding hegemon is largely responsible 
for the movement toward greater participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Chinese 
                                                 
223 Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, “Introducing China and UN Peacekeeping,” in China’s 
Evolving Approach to UN Peacekeeping, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (Routledge: New York, 
2012), 8. 
224 He, “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 50.  
225 Hirono and Lanteigne, “Introducing China and UN Peacekeeping,” 4. 
226 Ibid., 4 and 6. 
227 Richardson, “A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime,” 48. 
 56 
international relations analysts have been predicting the collapse of U.S. hegemony and 
trying to ensure that the PRC is well placed to take advantage of the new multipolar 
world.228 The perceived decline in the United States, as shown by the global financial 
crisis, the rise of the Group of 20 nations (G-20) over the Group of 8 (G-8), which were 
all western, and the growth of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) block, are all 
cited as examples by Chinese think tanks.229 China’s perception in a change in the great 
power politics has encouraged China to now take a much greater role in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. China wants others to see it as a “responsible power” 
contributing to the global good.  
Today, China argues that it is one of the strongest advocates for the UN and 
demonstrates this with financial and personnel contributions, and many see China’s 
support as advancing a liberal agenda. Although debates in China still often discuss the 
UN peacekeeping support as a potential U.S. or western attempt to contain China.230 
Conversely, this has not stopped China from moving further to embracing the concept of 
“harmonious world,” as touted by President Hu Jintao.231 The policy of protection of 
sovereignty was recently tested in Sudan as China struggled with the growing lobby of 
business interests and the business interests’ strong ties with a repressive governments 
and the international consequences of those ties.232 The conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region 
saw China modify its position on sovereignty and move away from its state centric 
beliefs that a state has the responsibility to protect its people from abuse and atrocities to 
a more liberal concept in which the international community has the responsibility to 
intervene and protect people in event of wide spread acts of violence.233 China has 
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modified its stance but also has clarified by suggesting that regions should build 
organizations that are capable of detecting and deterring escalating conflicts rapidly and 
only if necessary, request United Nations peacekeeping assistance.234 China maintains 
that the United Nations Security Council must maintain the right to vote for the 
authorization for the use of force.235 The China seeks to prevent itself from being drawn 
into a conflict and seeks to strictly adhere to “the principles of consent of the country 
concerned, non-use of force except in self-defense, and impartiality.”236 Nonetheless, 
China has voted in favor of the last ten peacekeeping missions that had a protection of 
civilians as a key element.237 China’s gradual involvement in the UN peacekeeping 
operations—from opposition, to non-interference, to cooperation, and to participation—
has been a slow process influenced by several factors. 
Chinese leadership today has reaffirmed its commitments to UN peacekeeping. At 
a Leaders Summit on UN Peacekeeping in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced 
China would maintain a standby force of 8,000 personnel ready for deployment within 60 
days for UN peacekeeping operations.238 In addition, President Xi proclaimed China 
would “train 2,000 international peacekeepers, give $100 million in military aid to the 
African Union, and send its first helicopter squad to peacekeeping operations in 
Africa.”239 China’s Minister of National Defense, Chang Wanquan, outlined his 
countries contributions to UN peacekeeping at the UN Defense Ministerial in 2016. He 
outlined that of the five permanent Security Council members China provides the most 
personnel and is the second largest provider of funding.240 He went on to say that China 
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had 2,500 personnel participating in nine different missions, and that China had provided 
over 33,000 personnel.241 
China has moved from protecting its self-interest to projecting itself in the 
international community. The commitments made by China go beyond self-interest and 
show a commitment to global norms on peacekeeping. President Xi has pushed China to 
expand its commitments to peacekeeping. At the same time China has ensured its 
Westphalian values are upheld in the Security Council; of its nine vetoes of UN Security 
Council resolutions on peacekeeping, four have come under President Xi’s tenure.  
China’s voting history in the UN demonstrates that both the UN and China have 
evolved overtime. Its recent voting record indicates that China is becoming more 
assertive through the Security Council. Figure 3 demonstrates the Chinese commitment to 
UN peacekeeping. Figure 3 depicts the number of peacekeeping operations approved per 
year since the PRC took a seat at the UN Security Council. 




Figure 3.  The Number of UN Peacekeeping Operations Approved by the UN per 
Year and through the Three Phases of Chinese Policy 
1971–2016242  
  
                                                 






Figure 4 demonstrates the range of votes on peacekeeping operations from China 
while sitting on the UN Security Council. The data from Figures 3 and 4 show a 
significant increase in UN peacekeeping votes after the end of the Cold War and how 
little China acts as a block to peacekeeping.  
 
Figure 4.  Types of Chinese Votes on UN Peacekeeping Operations 
from 1971 to 2016243  
  
                                                 




Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the Chinese commitment to UN votes and that they 
have been overwhelmingly supportive of UN peacekeeping operations. Especially when 
compared to other members of the UN Security Council as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Percentage of Permanent Security Council Members’ Veto Votes on 
Peacekeeping from 1971–2016244  
France and China are the only two states below 10% when it comes to vetoing 
peacekeeping proposals. China’s voting pattern and increasing troop and financial 
contributor to UN peacekeeping operations demonstrate its growing commitment to 
the UN.  
  
                                                 




Evidence in this chapter indicates that constructivist theories regarding identity 
and realist security self-interest heavily influenced China’ changing policy towards UN 
peacekeeping operations during different periods. Phase 1 of opposition was dominated 
by communist identity. The Sino-Soviet split was the result of identity clashes within the 
international communist movement. China previously viewed UN peacekeeping as tool 
by the superpowers to control smaller weaker states. China took the Westphalian 
approach that any intervention was a threat to state sovereignty. The Westphalian 
principles were rooted in the Chinese identity as a developing state that has suffered at 
the hands of stronger powers. The Sino-Soviet split enabled created a security concern 
that enabled China to a transition into Phase 2. In Phase 2 China became a member of the 
UN Security Council but softened its stance towards UN peacekeeping operations to that 
of non-intervention. An even clearer example of change in China’s policy towards UN 
peacekeeping operation occurred in 1981, when China shifted its policy again from non-
intervention to cooperation, and began voting to approve peacekeeping operations. The 
Glasnost between the United States and the Soviet Union once again left China 
concerned about its security in relation to the two superpowers, which pushed China to 
seek security in the UN. The shift from cooperation to participation was demonstrated by 
China seeking to demonstrate that it was a responsible power interested in participating in 
global institutions that were seen as providing humanitarian support to developing states. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzed the factors that most likely contributed to China’s change in 
policy towards UN peacekeeping operations using Yongjin Zhang’s framework of four 
phases: phase 1 from 1950–1971, condemnation; phase 2 from 1971–1981, non-
interference; phase 3 from 1981–1988, cooperation, and phase 4 from 1988–the present, 
participation. Constructivist theories dominate phase 1 and 4, while realist self-interest 
theories dominate phases 2 and 3. 
The roots of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian arguments can be seen in the 
international relations theories of Realists and constructionists. Realists see self-interest 
as the guiding principle of states in foreign policy. While, constructivists view the 
changing wants and demands of the community as a whole as a key contributor to foreign 
policy decisions. Neo-realists and constructivists see the following as key justifications 
for peacekeeping: self-interest which can be security concerns by improving international 
support against a rival, preventing refugee influxes, or taming civil unrest in similar 
ethnic communities.245 Financial self-interest can be either through resources gained 
from the host state, monetary or material benefits such as donations of equipment and UN 
payments for troop participation.246 These benefits can be used to improve domestic 
spending to increase their domestic legitimacy.247 The ability to send domestic rivals to a 
type of unofficial exile to improve domestic security for the regime.248 States undergoing 
a democratic transition need to demonstrate stability for future international investments 
and commitments and participation in international organizations can provide the 
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impression of stability and commitment to norms.249 States participate in peacekeeping to 
provide experience for the military in operations and in learning to follow constitutional 
rule.250 In addition, states undergoing a democratic transition seek to align with 
international organizations to provide elites with socializing opportunities to new 
norms.251 Justifications for humanitarian altruistic issues center on identity. States may 
identify with people impacted in foreign country.252 The identity of the state indicates 
that it should respond to a humanitarian crisis.253 Other states contribute so that they feel 
that they have done their part to contribute to global norms.254 
The UN has amalgamated these concepts into its peacekeeping policy. The UN is 
influenced by the two poles of Westphalian and post-Westphalian thought. The Cold War 
influenced the UN and also helped developing states. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 
the 1990s, the two superpower ceased their support to many fragile states. Without 
additional assistance many governments were no longer able to control their populations 
and wide spread unrest broke out. Table 3 illustrates the evolution of peacekeeping 
during key times, the dominant thought driving the peacekeeping, and how the 
peacekeeping was conducted changed during each period.  
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Table 3.   Evolution of UN Peacekeeping by Era, the Dominant Thought, 
and Method255 
Era Cold War Post-Cold War Post-9/11 








Interstate Buffer Intrastate buffer Intrastate rebuilding 
 
The UN stepped into the fray, at the urging of the post-Westphalians, with a new 
mandate to help developing fragile states deal with intrastate conflict. The UN had to 
modify its practices and techniques to handle this new assignment. The 1990s large scale 
man-made atrocities, as well as the increased pressure from developing states that were 
inundated with refugees, pushed many post-Westphalians to call for a transition to a 
deeper humanitarian commitment. The new mandate put forth called for a responsibility 
to protect. The principles called for all states to “prevent, react, and rebuild.”256 The 
Westphalians still oppose many of the principles of the responsibility to protect as they 
feel it interferes with state sovereignty, but they do support preventative measures and 
efforts to rebuild.   
Yongjin Zhang’s framework of four phases establishes a framework from which 
to examine the factors that have influenced how Chinese foreign policy has changed. The 
four phases are: condemnation from 1950 to 1971; non-interference from 1971–1981; 
cooperation 1981–1989; and participation from 1989 to the present. China has had three 
significant policy changes during those phases as outlined in Table 4. Table 4 also 
illustrates the key findings as to what motivates China’s UN peacekeeping policy in each 
of the phases.  
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Table 4.   Dominant Policy Factors Influencing Chinese Foreign Policy 
















Identity Self-Interest Self-Interest Identity 
 
The first change in 1971 was a result of the dominant identity being superseded 
by self-interest in the late 1960s. The hardline ideology created threats to the PRC from 
both the Soviet Union and the United States. The security situation deteriorated and 
China suppressed its hardline communist identity. This brought about a shift in policy 
from the United States which enabled China to take a seat on the UN Security Council. 
Now a member of the UN, China switched from opposition to non-interference. China 
continued to demonstrate its Westphalian principles by abstaining from debating, voting, 
and paying on any issues relating to peacekeeping.257 China still maintained a caustic 
rhetoric but did not actively seek to undermine peacekeeping operations, as several 
peacekeeping operations came up for renewal. 
 In the 1980s, the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union placed 
China in an awkward position as both countries began actions that appeared to be 
isolating China and moving closer together. China was once again feeling its self-interest 
impaired as a result of a change in its security position, moved to provide greater 
legitimacy to an international organization that China felt could be used to restrain any 
potential threat. China changed to a policy of cooperation, paying its dues and no longer 
abstaining from votes on peacekeeping. China shifted policy to embrace the UN and use 
it as an ally against any U.S. or Soviet actions.  
The next major shift of Chinese policy was a result of an identity shift. The 
improved security outlook and increased socialization of peacekeeping norms enabled 
China to view its self as a great power that can provide a new method to success for other 
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states. China began to emerge as a strong power and was challenged to be a responsible 
power by other great powers, especially the U.S. China accepted the challenge and began 
increasing its support to UN peacekeeping and the betterment of developing states. 
China’s identity as both a strong power and a developing state convinced it that it should 
act to help other developing states, by accepting peacekeeping norms.   
International relations scholars debate whether China is a revisionist power 
seeking to undermine the global standards, or has it accepted the norms. The increasing 
commitments to UN peacekeeping indicates that China is accepting the norms and to 
what degree. China has sought out key positions on committees to influence the decision 
making process, but China has not sought to rollback UN peacekeeping. China has 
sought to put specific restraints to ensure state sovereignty in keeping with its 
Westphalian principles. China has participated in UN peacekeeping policy debates and 
has worked to ensure that it has people in key leadership positions. The growing 
commitment of combat troops as well as the announcement of an 8,000 fast-response 
team indicate that China is deepening its commitment.258 The death of peacekeepers in 
combat demonstrate a resolve elicited from authorities, “In protecting world peace, 
Chinese soldiers are moving to the forefront, and will increasingly fact the test of blood 
and war. This reflects China’s responsibilities as a major power.”259 
China is seeking to increase the significance of the United Nations as a potential 
block to United States unilateral power. The increased significance of a respected 
international institution could act as a block to future U.S. actions. The U.S. would be 
wise to increase its influence in the UN through greater participation within key 
committees to ensure that China does not build a consensus against the U.S. as it has 
reduced its commitment to the organization. This will ensure the U.S. can influence the 
UN’s agenda.  
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